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The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between government expenditure and economic growth 
commonly known as Wagner’s law for one single Central and Eastern European country namely Romania. 
Using a dataset ranging from 1995 to 2015, we apply latest econometric time series techniques such as unit root 
test, Johansen cointegration and Granger causality test. The cointegration tests indicate support for Wagner’s 
hypothesis in all of its five versions, thus suggesting the existence of long-run relationship between government 
spending and national outcome. The causality tests show the absence of any short-run relationship from 
economic outcome to government expenditure in three out of five versions. However, taking into consideration 
that in its original formulation Wagner’s law explored the secular correlation between output and government 
commitments, we can state that the long run cointegration is more consistent with Adolph Wagner’s 
perspective.    
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1.Introduction 
 In the modern mixed economies, government sector plays an important role in one country 
development and progress by participating to the creation of the infrastructure and to capital 
formation, to the development of the human resources through the provision of generic named  
‘public goods’, and by stimulating saving and investment. In this sense, Pereira (2001) emphasized that 
that the emerging economies in Europe based their development strategies on massive public 
investments, whilst African countries will be condemned to poverty due weak infrastructure. Hyman 
(2011) also indicated that industrial nations have large government sectors and for most the 
government expenditures account for 25% to 50% of GDP.  
The issue on the government size has raised considerable interest and has generated extensive debate 
among economists particularly on its controversial effects on economic growth. Ram (1986) argued 
that a larger government size is likely to be detrimental to economic growth because government 
operations are often conducted inefficiently, the regulatory process imposes excessive burdens and 
costs on economic system and many of government’s fiscal and monetary policies distort economic 
incentives and lower productivity. On the other hand, he asserted that larger government size can also 
be a powerful engine of economic development because of its role in harmonizing private and social 
interests, in preventing the exploitation of one country by foreigners and in securing an increase in 
productive investments and in providing a social optimal direction for growth and development.      
Carr (1989) also suggested that a government less efficient than the private sector, specifically in the 
production of collective goods may lead to a slower growth whilst if government provides an optimal 
level of public goods that would be unavailable if there were only private producers, than increased in 
government activity may results in a higher economic growth.  
One of the oldest way in explaining government sector growth is commonly known as ‘Wagner’s law’ 
or as ‘law of increasing state activities’ was postulated by Adolf Wagner (1883; see Wagner 1958) who 
stated that public expenditure is an inevitable outcome of economic growth and implied that public 
expenditure increases faster than economic growth. Peacock and Scott (2000) considered that 
Wagner’s law entails that there is both and absolute and relative expansion of public sector within the 
national economy, particularly of government services for communal purposes. According to Cullis 
and Jones (1998) this law predicts that this relationship will continue because the state would need to 
expand administration and law and order services, there would be a concern with the distributional 
issues and there also would be a greater need to control private monopolies. Recently, Afonso and 
Alves (2016) indicated two additional hypotheses which can also explain the dynamic nature of the 
relationship between government expenditures and economic growth: (i) Fiscal Stimulus Hypothesis 
where government can run counter-cyclical policies to reduce the business cycle; and (ii) the Budget 
Stickiness Hypothesis arguing that public spending should not change since the public expenditures 
policies are targeted in the long-run perspective. 
There is a rich literature investigating Wagner’s law. Among the earliest studies, we can mention the 
paper of Peacock and Wiseman (1961) who were the first trying to shed some light on this hypothesis. 
Acknowledging Wagner’s work, they also developed a new theory which is better known as the 
‘displacement effect’. The contribution of the earlier studies is important, particularly if we take into 
account the fact that Adolf Wagner was not technically explicit in the formulation of his hypothesis 
and made clear that this law based on empirical observation for a number of countries for which he 
noticed a common rising trend of output per capita, and thus he explained the expanding state activity. 
The subsequent studies brought a ‘modern formulation on Wagner’s law’. Musgrave (1969) analysed 
the relationship between public sector growth and per capita income by making a clear distinction 
between government consumption, investment spending and transfers and in each case found no 
explicit reason for expecting income elastic demand. Bird (1971) found considerable support for the 
relationship between the relative growth of the public sector and the increase in per capita income. 
Wagner and Weber (1977) undertook a cross-sectional analysis for 34 countries over the post-World 
War II period and examined the correlation between growth of income and growth of government 
both absolute and relative. They found that there were almost as many countries for which Wagner’s 
law can be rejected as there are countries for which it can be accepted.  Over the past two decades, 
the increase in the government spending has been attracted again the interest of many economists in 
the study of Wagner’s law which has been reinforced also with the help of new econometric 
techniques. The most important contribution over the 90s and early 2000 are the following: 
Henrekson (1993), Bairam (1997), Dutt and Ghosh (1997), Peacock and Scott (2000), Dluhosch and 
Zimmermann (2006). These studies provides empirical evidence but also bring new political and 
economic foundations of Wagner’s law. We also found recent studies which are more concerned in 
the empirical investigation of Wagner’s hypothesis particularly for panel data. In this sense, we note 
Lamartina and Zaghini (2011) who conducted a panel cointegration analysis for 23 OECD countries 
over the period 1970-2006 and found empirical support for the existence of a long-run positive 
relationship between government spending and economic growth. Magazzino, Giolli and Mele (2015) 
undertook an extensive analysis of the government spending-economic growth relationship for a panel 
consisting of 27 European Union countries over 1980-2013. They studied the correlation between real 
GDP and general government expenditure, total government expenditure and investment expenditure 
and revealed that there the expenditures share a common trend and a long run relationship with real 
national income, hence supporting the validity of Wagner’s law.  More recent, Afonso and Alves (2016) 
examined Wagner’s hypothesis using panel model and Seemingly Unrelated Regression methods to 
estimate public expenditures-income elasticities for 14 European countries during 1996 and 2013. 
They showed that some functions of government spending for few countries such as Austria, France, 
the Netherlands and Portugal do validate Wagner’s law. 
Regarding the validity of Wagner’s law for Central and Eastern European countries, we found that 
there are only few studies examined this nexus between government expenditure and economic 
growth. Paparas and Richter (2015) made an outstanding survey of the literature exploring Wagner’s 
hypothesis. They reviewed 126 articles and found only one examining the law of expanding state 
activity for the case of Slovenia over the period 1992-2007 (Dolenc, 2009). The results supported 
Wagner’s law and indicated that the political orientation in Slovenia at that time did not change 
significantly the trend in public finances. Szarowska (2012) also conducted an analysis in 8 Central and 
Eastern European countries in period 1995-2009 and found elasticity coefficient greater than one for 
all spending functions as well as for total government expenditures which is consistent with the 
interpretation of Wagner’s law.  We can also note Magazzino, Giolli and Mele (2015) who provided 
empirical results for Central and Eastern European economies as country-specific. We believe that 
there are some reasons explaining the reduced interest in investigating this hypothesis for this group 
of countries. One important constrain in applying simple or advanced econometric techniques for 
single time series is limited data availability. In the view of Peacock and Wiseman (1961), Adolph 
Wagner was concerned with the secular behavior of expenditure rather that with short-run change. 
This implies, that the trend in the relationship between government spending and economic growth 
should be observed on longer term which requires large number of observations. Given the fact that 
previously to 1990, all these countries were governed by the communist regime and that the public 
sector was ponderous and government controlled much of the means of production and regulated 
most economic activity and investment and production decisions where embodied in a plan of 
production established by the political leaders and prices were set by the planners., we believe that 
studying the increasing state activity hypothesis during that period is to some extent against of 
Wagner’s philosophical foundations of his law. In addition to our belief, Kolodko (2001) argued that 
all of these economies had been growing over the four decades before 1990, but the growth was of a 
‘bad quality’ and despite a high growth rate in the region the living standard was not improving very 
fast and that the communist model of development was based on an expansion of heavy industries 
and an investment drive, with consumption growing always on a slower rate. One main reason that 
lies at the ground of Wagner’s expanding state activity was that the growth in real income will lead to 
a relative expansion of cultural and welfare expenditures (Henrekson, 1993). To some extent, the 
situation of the communist countries and their development was contrary to Wagner’s rationale on 
economic growth.  Thus, for most of the Central and Eastern European countries the most relevant 
data starts in 1990 which makes the analysis difficult at least from technical perspective.       
However, the aim of our study is to explore the validity of Wagner’s law for one single Eastern 
European country namely Romania. To some extent our work represents also an attempt to reassess 
previous literature with regard to this hypothesis for Romania’s case. The earliest study that we found 
is of Panaite, Vasilescu and Stoian (2001) who investigated Wagner’s law for the total government 
expenditures as well as for government functions over the period 1990-2001. The results were mixed 
also because of the small number of observations. Andrei et al. (2009) examined the hypothesis for 
total government expenditure as well as for the military spending for a period ranged from 1985 to 
2000 and showed support for Wagner’s law for both expenditure. The main shortcoming of this study 
besides the small number of observations is that it used data before 1990 when Romania was a 
centrally planned economy. Moreover, Ben-Ner and Montias (1989) also pointed out that unlike other 
East European countries, Romania did not decentralize decision-making to the level of government-
owned enterprises, had no significant private sector and did not rely on markets. Thus, we believe that 
is not totally consistent with Wagner’s original view on government role in economy. We also can 
mention Magazzino, Giolli and Mele (2015) who used the dynamic online learning support technique 
for heterogeneous cointegrated panel and the results provided for Romania’s case supported Wagner’s 
law. However, Granger causality test indicated the existence of a neutral relationship between gross 
domestic product and general government expenditure in the short-run. The authors conducted their 
analysis over 1980-2013 which means that they included the communist regime period. We also 
express our doubts on data availability with Ameco before 1990, which suggest that the author relied 
on a dataset consisting at most 19 observations. 
The contribution of our study to the existing literature is that we use the largest dataset so far ranged 
from 1995 to 2015 and focus our investigation only on the period after 1990 when Romania made an 
important turn from the communist regime to capitalism. From the economic perspective, this change 
led to the establishment of a market oriented economy based on the private ownership and where 
investment, production and distribution decisions are driven by the supply and demand in the market 
as well as the prices. Consequently, the role of the government has changed and should be in 
accordance with the market economy principles which imply a limited but active government as in 
modern interpretation (Sobel, 2005). Moreover, Romania presents some features by comparison with 
the rest of the European Union countries that make it an interested case to be explored particularly 
from Wagner’s hypothesis perspective (see Tables 1 to 5 in the Appendix). Romania is the second 
largest country in Central and Eastern Europe next to Poland and one of the largest in Europe as 
regards the total population. It is situated in the upper quartile next to Germany, Spain, France, Italy 
and the United Kingdom (Table 1 in the Appendix). But, the GDP per capita is low and is placed in 
the lower quartile (Table 2 in the Appendix). Excepting the Czech Republic which ranks in the 2nd 
quartile, all of the ex-communist countries are positioned next to Romania which reflects the status 
of these countries as emerging economies in Europe. Kolodko (2001) emphasized that after a short-
period of transitional contraction it was expected that the new system will lead to recovery and then 
o fast growth. But, the transitional recession lasted much than expected and instead of a rapid and 
robust growth the depression continued in some countries over the whole decade which explains to 
some extent the current situation. However, Romania was one of the fastest growing economies in 
Europe being positioned in the 3rd quartile next to Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia which indicates 
country’s potential in achieving development (Table 3 in the Appendix). By comparison, government 
total expenditure as share to GDP and per inhabitant rank in the lower quartile (Table 4 and Table 5 
in the Appendix). Nevertheless, we are interested in the dynamic relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth and if we look to the evolution of the total government expenditure 
per inhabitant and GDP per capita over 1995 and 2015, we can observe an increasing tendency for 
both indicators as presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Note: the data available for the gross domestic product per capita ranges from 1995 to 2013. 
This provides support and motivation for our investigation. Furthermore, we believe that the 
expanding government sector could be a natural effect of development. When higher industrialization, 
modernization and accompanying urbanization will emerge, this will require government expenditure 
on law and order, and to control natural monopolies in order to enhance economic efficiency 
(Henrekson, 1993). 
For the purpose of our study, we organize the paper as follows: in Section 2 we describe the 
methodology of investigation and the dataset. Section 3 presents and discusses the results and the final 
section comprises of the main concluding remarks and policy recommendations. 
 
2.Methodology 
Peacock and Wiseman (2000) made the first attempt to synthetize the methodological approaches in 
investigating Wagner’s law. But, maybe the most important issue to consider for modelling time series 
data nowadays is to test for stationarity of the collected data, since the series are stationary we start 
the analysis. Brooks (2002) implied that when we use non-stationary data can lead to a spurious 
regression. The empirical results may seem in accordance with theory and the tested hypotheses, 
however, results are without meaning. 
The unit root test is a test of stationarity and non-stationarity that has become generally popular over 
the last decades. Several tests for a presence of unit roots in time-series data have appeared in literature, 
some of them are Dickey and Fuller (1979), Phillips-Perron (1988) and Kwiatkowski et al. (1992).  
There are several methods to test for cointegration between two or more variables (Engle and 
Granger, 1987). Cointegration tests should reveal whether the national income and government 
spending move together over a long time period. First it is important to distinguish between the 
univariate and the multivariate approach.  
The univariate approach to cointegration implies a pairwise analysis of the different variables that 
measure national income and government spending. The Engle-Granger single-equation method is 
applied to perform pairwise analysis of those variables. It allows only for one endogenous and one 
exogenous variable. We will also apply the Johansen method for pairwise cointegration to check the 
consistency and reliability of the results achieved with the Engle-Granger method.  
The multivariate approach to cointegration tests whether there is cointegration in a system of more 
than two variables. The Johansen method is widely used to perform this analysis (Juselius, 2006). It 
improves some of the drawbacks with the Engle-Granger method (Brooks, 2008). The Johansen 
method allows for all variables to be endogenous and makes it possible to determine all cointegrating 
relationships between the examined variables.  
The Engle-Granger test is a single-equation method used to determine whether there is a cointegrating 
relationship between two variables (Engle and Granger, 1987). The precondition to examine 
cointegration is that the variables are both non-stationary and integrated of the same order.  
The Engle-Granger cointegration test is very popular mostly because it is easy to estimate the 
regression using OLS and the error correction model provides valuable information about the speed 
of adjustment to equilibrium. Therefore it is often used when testing for pairwise cointegration 
(Richards, 1995; Jang and Sul, 2003).  
However, there are several problems with this method. One of the drawbacks with using OLS 
regression in general is that it can identify only one cointegrating vector even when there are many 
variables in the system (Dolado et al., 1990). On the other hand, the Johansen method makes it 
possible to detect all cointegrating relationship in a system of variables.  
Other problems with the EG tests are linked to the usual small sample problems and unit root testing 
(Harris and Sollis, 2003): lack of power in stationarity tests, which is a typical ADF test problem; 
standard inference cannot be used, as the included variables are non-stationary; potentially biased 
results, which usually occurs if a variable that belongs to the model is omitted from the regression. 
There could be more than one cointegrating vector in a system of variables and the Johansen method 
can discover all such cointegrating relations (Juselius, 2006; Johansen and Juselius, 1990; Kasa, 1992). 
The Johansen method relies on a vector autoregression (VAR) model. A VAR is a system regression 
model which includes more than one dependent variable. Every variable is regressed on a combination 
of its own lagged values and lagged values of other variables from the system.  
Cointegration indicates existence of a long-run relationship between variables. Even when the 
variables are not cointegrated in the long-run, they might still be related in the short-run. In order to 
understand short-run interdependence among stock markets, Granger causality tests will be 
performed.  
Granger causality test is based on a standard F-test which seeks to determine if changes in one variable 
cause changes in another variable. A variable X is said to ‘Granger cause’ variable Y, if the previous 
values of X could predict the current value of Y. 
We conduct our analysis on a dataset comprising annual data on absolute (G) and relative (GGDP) 
total government expenditure, on gross domestic product (GDP) and on gross domestic product per 
capita (GDPP) and on total population (P) spanning from 1995 to 2015. The data was provided by 
Ameco. The descriptive statistics for the dataset are reported in Table 6 in the Appendix.  
3.Results 
3.1.Unit root tests 
Several tests for a presence of unit roots in time-series data have appeared in literature, some of them 
are Dickey and Fuller (1979), Phillips-Perron (1988) tests. The first step of our analysis is to verify the 
order of integration of the variables since the causality tests are only valid if the variables have the 
same order of integration. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are applied 
in order to determine the order of integration of the tested variables.  The tested series are LG (total 
government expenditure), LGDP (gross domestic product), LP (population), L(GDPP) (GDP per 
capita), L(GGDP) (total government expenditure as a share of real GDP) and L(GP) (total 
government expenditure per capita) for the period of 1995-2015 in natural logarithms. Our empirical 
results are reported in Table 1.  The ADF and PP tests statistics for all variables do not exceed the 
critical values in absolute terms, indicating that the tested variables are I(0) and their levels are 
stationary12. 
Table 1   Results of ADF and PP unit root tests 
Test ln G ln GDP ln GDPP ln GGDP ln GP 
ADF Statistic -7.38* [1**] -8.28* [0] -8.15* [0] -3.75* [2] -7.19* [0] 
PP Statistic -7.22* [0***] -18.39* [9] -19.52* [10] -3.92* [2] -7.19* [0] 
Note: The ADF and PP critical confidence values at 5% are -3.029 and -3.020, respectively.  * indicate 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. .** parentheses in ADF indicate the lag 
length based on SIC.***Parentheses in PP indicate the Bandwith,  Newey-West using Barlett  kernel. 
3.2.Unit root test with breaks 
The long–run relationship between two tested variables can be affected by the presence of structural 
breaks in the data. These possible breaks can be a result of economic regime or a change in the factors 
(government spending, taxation, population etc.) that determine and affect the tested series. Hence, if 
structural breaks are not taken into account when investigating the existence of a long–run 
relationship, there is a possibility that linear methods may fail to confirm the relationship when in fact 
it does exist. 
Zivot and Andrews (1992) recursive approach is used in order to examine the null hypothesis that 
series have a unit root agaianst the alternative of stationarity with structural change at some unknown 
break date denoted by Tb. The break date is chosen endogenously as the value, over all possible break 
points, which minimises the test statistic for testing ρ = 1 for the following regression: 
𝐘𝐭 = 𝛍 + 𝛃𝐭 + 𝛒𝐘𝐭−𝟏 + 𝛉𝐃𝐔𝐭 + 𝛄𝐃𝐓𝐭 + 𝛅𝐃(𝐓𝐛)𝐭 + ∑ 𝐜𝐢𝚫𝐘𝐭−𝟏
𝐤
𝐢=𝟏 + 𝛆𝐭   (1)  
Where DTt is the shift in trend and is equal with t-Tbif t > Tb and 0 otherwise, DUt is the shift in the 
mean and DUt = 1 if t > Tband 0 otherwise. Tb is equals one at the observation after the break point, 
while the additional one-time dummy D(Tb)t=1 if t= Tb+1 and 0 otherwise. This “innovational 




                                                          
1 The null hypothesis is non-stationarity in series, while the alternative hypothesis is stationarity. The null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected 
in favor of the alternative hypothesis, if the test statistics is more negative than the critical values. The optimal lag lengths as well as the ADF test 
results obtained from the software package EViews. 
2 As the ADF test is sensitive to the chosen lag length, a sensitivity analysis was performed for different lag lengths. The test results showed no 
sensitivity to the chosen, optimal lag length. If we increase or reduce the lag length, the results will still show non-stationarity of stock markets. 
Table 2   Unit root tests with structural breaks 
Variable Break date Test Statistic P-Value Critical Value 5% 
LG 2014 -7.036 <0.01 -4.443 
LGDP 2010 -9.912 <0.01 -4.443 
LGDPP 2010 -9.68 <0.01 -4.443 
LGGDP 2008 -5.26 <0.01 -4.443 
LP 2014 -7.024 <0.01 -4.443 
 
The results of the Zivot-Andrews unit root test, which is able to capture the impact of structural 
breaks, are given in Table 2. The Zivot-Andrews test with one structural break finds no additional 
evidence against the unit root null hypothesis relative to the unit root tests without a structural break. 
In other words, in models the null hypotheses are not rejected for the variables. 
3.3.Cointegration Approach 
Johansen’s cointegration approach uses the maximum likelihood estimation in a VAR model. There 
are two statistics created by this approach: the trace statistic and maximum Eigenvalue. The Trace 
statistic examine the null hypothesis that there is at most r number of cointegrating vectors and the  
alternative hypothesis of r or more than r number of cointegrating vectors. The maximum Eigenvalue 
statistics examine for r number of cointegrating vectors against the alternative of r+1 number of 
cointegrating vectors. The Johansen’s cointegration test will demonstrate if there exists a long run 
relationship between government spending and national income.  
We found evidence from ADF and PP tests that all the series are integrated of order zero (I(0)). We 
will test the five specifications of the Wagner’s law that are available in the literature.  The results of 
Johansen approach are reported at tables 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 for all the models and indicate that there is 
one cointegration vector between the tested series during 1995-2015. This happens because we reject 
the null hypothesis that r=0, so we have at least one cointegrating vector.   
Table 3   Cointegration test on Peacock Version, Wagner’s law 
1995-2015          
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum 
Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  Hypothesized Max-
Eigen 
0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** No. of 
CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
r=0*  0.718044  23.33246  12.32090  0.0005 r=0*  0.718044  22.78805  11.22480  0.0003 
r=1  0.029792  0.544414  4.129906  0.5230 r=1  0.029792  0.544414  4.129906  0.5230 
Note: * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.  **MacKinnon-Haug-
Michelis (1999) p-values. 
Table 4   Cointegration test on Goffman Version, Wagner’s law 
1995-2015          
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum 
Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  Hypothesized Max-
Eigen 
0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** No. of 
CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
r=0*  0.592880  16.17596  12.32090  0.0108 r=0*  0.592880  16.17565  11.22480  0.0063 
r=1  1.71E-05  0.000308  4.129906  0.9902 r=1  1.71E-05  0.000308  4.129906  0.9902 
Note: * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.  **MacKinnon-Haug-
Michelis (1999) p-values. 
Table 5   Cointegration test on Musgrave Version, Wagner’s Law 
1995-2015          
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum 
Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  Hypothesized Max-
Eigen 
0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** No. of 
CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
r=0*  0.515481  13.40410  12.32090  0.0328 r=0*  0.515481  13.04278  11.22480  0.0237 
r=1  0.019873  0.361321  4.129906  0.6107 r=1  0.019873  0.361321  4.129906  0.6107 
Note: * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.  **MacKinnon-Haug-
Michelis (1999) p-values. 
Table 6   Cointegration test on Gupta Version, Wagner’s law 
1995-2015          
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum 
Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  Hypothesized Max-
Eigen 
0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** No. of 
CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
r=0*  0.712904  23.28225  12.32090  0.0005 r=0*  0.712904  22.46292  11.22480  0.0004 
r=1  0.044498  0.819335  4.129906  0.4213 r=1  0.044498  0.819335  4.129906  0.4213 
Note: * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.  **MacKinnon-Haug-
Michelis (1999) p-values. 
 
 
Table 7   Cointegration test on Mann Version, Wagner’s law 
1995-2015          
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)  Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum 
Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  Hypothesized Max-
Eigen 
0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** No. of 
CE(s) 
Eigenvalue Statistic Critical 
Value 
Prob.** 
r=0*  0.517064  13.32865  12.32090  0.0338 r=0*  0.517064  13.10167  11.22480  0.0231 
r=1  0.012530  0.226972  4.129906  0.6915 r=1  0.012530  0.226972  4.129906  0.6915 
Note: * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.  **MacKinnon-Haug-
Michelis (1999) p-values. 
The indication is that there is one cointegrating vector in each of these 4 pairs at 5% significance level. 
Both Trace and Max test confirm this conclusion. 
3.5.Granger causality tests  
If two variables are cointegrated, we can use the Granger causality test (Granger 1969) in order to 
check the short run relationship between variables. The Granger causality test examine whether 
variable Y’s current value can be explained by its own past value and whether the explanatory power 
could be improved by adding the past value of another variable X. If the coefficient of X is statistically 
significant, X is said to Granger cause Y. 
The Granger causality test is very sensitive to the lags used in the OLS regressions (Gujarati 2003). In 
our analysis, various lag length selection criteria are used in order to determine the lags for Granger 
causality test. The tests we use are the following: LR – sequential modified LR test statistic, FPE – 
Final prediction error, AIC – Akaike information criterion, SC – Schwarz information criterion and 
HQ – Hannah-Quinn information criterion. These tests determined one lag. 
We run the Granger causality test for all the versions of the law by using 2 lags for all versions in order 
to ensure uncorrelated residuals. We found in the previous section that there is one cointegration 
vector for all the models, so we can define the Granger causality tests as joint test (F-tests) for the 
significance of the lagged value of the assumed exogenous variable and for the significance of the 
error correction term.  
Table 8   Granger causality test, Wagner’s Law 
1995-2015       




LGDP causes LG 
 4.852* 0.025 
LG causes LGDP 
 0.739 0.495 
Goffman 
Version 
L(GDPP) causes LG 
 3.004 0.082 
LG causes L(GDPP) 




L(GGDP)  0.110 0.896 
L(GGDP) causes 
L(GDPP)  0.687 0.519 
Gupta 
Version 
L(GDPP) causes L(GP) 
 4.576* 0.029 
L(GP) causes L(GDPP) 




L(GGDP)  0.145 0.866 
L(GGDP) causes LGDP 
 0.739 0.495 
Note: * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance. 
The results are reported in Table 8 and indicate that Granger causality is running from income to 
spending in Peacock and Gupta versions and so provide support of the validity of Wagner’s law. In 




This paper uses the latest time series techniques to study the relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth in Romania. First, we study the unit root properties of the variables. 
We find that logarithms of government expenditure and GDP in their various formulations (like total, 
per capita) are stationary in their levels.  
Next, we conduct Johansen cointegration tests for pairs of variables which do not involve log of the 
government expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The results indicate all pairs of variables are 
cointegrated and the number of cointegrating vector is equal to one in each case. The cointegrating 
vectors show that all three pairs of variables have a long run positive relationship as expected, while 
all the calculated income elasticities are according to the theory and support the validity of Wagner’s 
Law. 
Finally, we conduct the augmented Granger causality tests between pairs of variables. The results show 
that no matter what lag is used, causality does not flow in any direction in any of the cases.  
Thus, the results indicate that the growth of GDP does not cause growth of government expenditure. 
This result is possible if non-economic factors are more important in explaining the growth of 
government expenditure than economic factors.  
The policy implication is that the present structure of government expenditure is not very conducive 
to economic growth. However, it is quite possible that a different structure of government expenditure 
can contribute more effectively to economic growth. Thus, while the presence of a long run 
relationship between GDP and government expenditure (in their various forms) support the Wagner’s 
Law, causality tests tell another story. However, In other words, causality tests indicate the absence of 
short run relationship whereas the presence of cointegration indicates long run relationship. 
The relationship between government spending and national output is important for many policy-
related issues. For instance, recessionary (expansionary) periods impede (enhance) central authorities’ 
abilities to stimulate their economy via fiscal measures unless the share of government spending to 
GDP increases (reduces). Long run estimates of the relationship between government expenditure 
and national output would permit the identification of a benchmark against which one can identify 
the fiscal policy stance adopted by particular governments. The government spending and national 
output relationship is also relevant for the debate on the sustainability of public finances, especially 
during the phase when governments struggle to restrain government spending. Therefore, the 
identification of this relationship provides a theoretical framework against which to formulate and 
judge fiscal policy adjustment plans concerning medium term budgetary objectives. 
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Table 1   Descriptive statistics of total population (1000 persons) during 1995-2015 
Country average stdev median min max q1 q2 q3 q4 
Belgium 10596.55 394.79 10478.62 10136.81 11286.58 10251.25 10478.62 10920.27 11286.58 
Bulgaria 7738.99 411.93 7658.97 7180.59 8406.07 7395.60 7658.97 8170.17 8406.07 
Czech 
Republic 10344.25 124.86 10304.13 10194.00 10546.40 10238.91 10304.13 10474.41 10546.40 
Denmark 5441.15 132.05 5419.43 5233.37 5684.11 5339.62 5419.43 5547.68 5684.11 
Germany 81877.77 621.85 82047.20 80425.82 82534.18 81678.05 82047.20 82349.93 82534.18 
Estonia 1360.28 36.00 1354.78 1312.05 1436.63 1331.48 1354.78 1388.12 1436.63 
Ireland 4166.68 383.87 4159.91 3608.84 4644.93 3805.17 4159.91 4560.16 4644.93 
Greece 10904.55 166.99 10928.07 10562.15 11121.34 10805.81 10928.07 11045.01 11121.34 
Spain 43375.52 2962.36 43653.16 39387.02 46773.06 40263.22 43653.16 46442.77 46773.06 
France 62866.37 2330.38 63001.25 59418.72 66472.73 60762.17 63001.25 64818.79 66472.73 
Croatia 4356.33 118.47 4308.29 4216.25 4620.03 4296.35 4308.29 4396.57 4620.03 
Italy 58456.69 1495.79 58190.59 56884.67 60789.14 56982.54 58190.59 59829.62 60789.14 
Cyprus 755.01 73.40 738.54 650.87 863.95 694.02 738.54 829.45 863.95 
Latvia 2233.04 161.28 2238.80 1977.83 2485.06 2097.56 2238.80 2367.55 2485.06 
Lithuania 3294.20 239.95 3322.53 2905.00 3629.10 3097.28 3322.53 3499.54 3629.10 
Luxembourg 474.19 48.23 465.16 408.63 566.68 436.30 465.16 506.95 566.68 
Hungary 10094.37 148.98 10087.07 9839.30 10328.97 10000.02 10087.07 10210.97 10328.97 
Malta 400.94 18.53 403.83 370.43 431.21 385.81 403.83 414.51 431.21 
Netherlands 16259.24 452.26 16319.87 15459.01 16940.39 15925.51 16319.87 16615.39 16940.39 
Austria 8216.90 209.70 8227.83 7948.28 8618.44 8011.57 8227.83 8363.40 8618.44 
Poland 38237.37 222.65 38165.45 38009.65 38663.48 38063.26 38165.45 38258.63 38663.48 
Portugal 10387.75 176.39 10457.30 10026.18 10573.10 10289.90 10457.30 10522.29 10573.10 
Romania 21270.55 1040.72 21319.69 19866.45 22684.27 20246.87 21319.69 22442.97 22684.27 
Slovenia 2015.24 30.41 2000.47 1981.63 2063.53 1989.87 2000.47 2048.58 2063.53 
Slovakia 5387.30 16.77 5383.29 5362.00 5422.43 5373.37 5383.29 5396.02 5422.43 
Finland 5271.26 117.15 5246.10 5107.79 5479.88 5176.21 5246.10 5363.35 5479.88 
Sweden 9146.97 313.62 9029.60 8826.90 9799.20 8872.10 9029.60 9378.10 9799.20 
United 
Kingdom 60901.18 2314.28 60401.21 58019.03 65113.29 58892.51 60401.21 62766.37 65113.29 
EU-28 17708.24 22371.79 8722.67 370.43 82534.18 3624.04 8722.67 17671.90 82534.18 






Table 2   Descriptive statistics of gross domestic product per capita (euro per inhabitant) 
during 1995-2013 
Country average stdev median min max q1 q2 q3 q4 
Belgium 27921.05 4628.00 28000.00 21400.00 34500.00 24000.00 28000.00 32000.00 34500.00 
Bulgaria 3026.32 1619.27 2600.00 800.00 5500.00 1600.00 2600.00 4600.00 5500.00 
Czech 
Republic 9747.37 3909.87 9000.00 4300.00 14800.00 5950.00 9000.00 13900.00 14800.00 
Denmark 36431.58 6042.45 36500.00 26600.00 44400.00 31600.00 36500.00 42150.00 44400.00 
Germany 27326.32 3265.96 26600.00 23200.00 33300.00 24650.00 26600.00 29800.00 33300.00 
Estonia 7726.32 3938.53 7200.00 2000.00 13900.00 4200.00 7200.00 11400.00 13900.00 
Ireland 31594.74 8623.06 35200.00 14400.00 43100.00 25950.00 35200.00 36350.00 43100.00 
Greece 15261.11 4269.89 16200.00 8500.00 20800.00 11250.00 16200.00 18700.00 20800.00 
Spain 18773.68 4274.58 19700.00 11600.00 23900.00 15050.00 19700.00 22550.00 23900.00 
France 26294.74 3801.97 26500.00 20200.00 31300.00 23200.00 26500.00 29750.00 31300.00 
Croatia 7594.74 2571.31 7700.00 3600.00 11000.00 5150.00 7700.00 10150.00 11000.00 
Italy 22842.11 3366.55 24000.00 15200.00 26300.00 20450.00 24000.00 25650.00 26300.00 
Cyprus 16873.68 3796.32 17300.00 10800.00 21800.00 13800.00 17300.00 20600.00 21800.00 
Latvia 6031.58 3401.48 4900.00 1500.00 11600.00 3250.00 4900.00 9100.00 11600.00 
Lithuania 6131.58 3345.32 5400.00 1400.00 11700.00 3250.00 5400.00 8900.00 11700.00 
Luxembourg 61042.11 16128.25 59900.00 38600.00 83400.00 48200.00 59900.00 76900.00 83400.00 
Hungary 7310.53 2554.71 8100.00 3400.00 10500.00 4650.00 8100.00 9700.00 10500.00 
Malta 12300.00 2924.99 11800.00 7500.00 17200.00 10500.00 11800.00 14500.00 17200.00 
Netherlands 29842.11 5570.39 30200.00 20700.00 36200.00 25350.00 30200.00 35100.00 36200.00 
Austria 29405.26 4819.92 28700.00 23000.00 37000.00 25450.00 28700.00 33550.00 37000.00 
Poland 6426.32 2463.02 5600.00 2800.00 10100.00 4500.00 5600.00 8700.00 10100.00 
Portugal 13678.95 2439.62 14200.00 9000.00 16300.00 12100.00 14200.00 15850.00 16300.00 
Romania 3763.16 2247.52 2800.00 1300.00 7100.00 1700.00 2800.00 6050.00 7100.00 
Slovenia 13626.32 3528.75 13600.00 8100.00 18400.00 10650.00 13600.00 17150.00 18400.00 
Slovakia 7489.47 3948.54 6300.00 2800.00 13300.00 3900.00 6300.00 11750.00 13300.00 
Finland 28715.79 5500.43 29100.00 19600.00 35600.00 24600.00 29100.00 33650.00 35600.00 
Sweden 32331.58 6199.29 31500.00 22000.00 43800.00 27950.00 31500.00 36500.00 43800.00 
United 
Kingdom 26942.11 4955.28 28100.00 15600.00 34200.00 25000.00 28100.00 29900.00 34200.00 
EU-28 19166.29 13949.51 16300.00 800.00 83400.00 8400.00 16300.00 27900.00 83400.00 







Table 3   Descriptive statistics of real GDP growth rate (%) during 1995-2015 
Country average stdev median min max q1 q2 q3 q4 
Belgium 1.79 1.48 1.80 -2.28 3.71 0.81 1.80 2.69 3.71 
Bulgaria 2.75 3.74 2.97 -6.69 7.68 1.28 2.97 5.65 7.68 
Czech 
Republic 2.58 2.91 2.71 -4.84 6.88 1.44 2.71 4.29 6.88 
Denmark 1.36 1.99 1.26 -5.09 3.80 0.47 1.26 2.90 3.80 
Germany 1.35 2.04 1.69 -5.62 4.08 0.71 1.69 1.99 4.08 
Estonia 4.27 5.95 5.32 -14.72 11.80 2.46 5.32 7.58 11.80 
Ireland 5.15 4.46 5.83 -5.64 11.18 2.59 5.83 8.91 11.18 
Greece 0.93 4.39 2.86 -9.13 5.79 -0.34 2.86 3.92 5.79 
Spain 2.14 2.51 3.17 -3.57 5.29 1.12 3.17 3.77 5.29 
France 1.58 1.50 1.95 -2.94 3.88 0.82 1.95 2.36 3.88 
Croatia 2.20 3.56 3.43 -7.38 6.65 -0.36 3.43 5.15 6.65 
Italy 0.60 2.04 1.29 -5.48 3.71 0.15 1.29 1.69 3.71 
Cyprus 2.43 3.50 3.23 -5.94 9.92 1.36 3.23 4.60 9.92 
Latvia 4.02 6.02 5.40 -14.35 11.90 2.36 5.40 8.34 11.90 
Lithuania 4.33 5.33 5.15 -14.81 11.09 3.03 5.15 7.41 11.09 
Luxembourg 3.57 3.39 4.07 -5.38 8.44 1.52 4.07 5.68 8.44 
Hungary 2.19 2.68 3.24 -6.56 4.94 0.84 3.24 3.85 4.94 
Malta 3.26 2.07 3.54 -2.46 6.41 2.54 3.54 4.06 6.41 
Netherlands 1.96 2.14 2.03 -3.77 5.05 1.01 2.03 3.57 5.05 
Austria 1.82 1.68 2.14 -3.80 3.62 0.88 2.14 2.81 3.62 
Poland 4.16 1.80 3.92 1.25 7.20 3.28 3.92 5.14 7.20 
Portugal 1.22 2.37 1.55 -4.03 4.79 0.20 1.55 2.49 4.79 
Romania 2.97 4.25 3.75 -7.07 8.46 0.64 3.75 5.59 8.46 
Slovenia 2.65 3.24 3.30 -7.80 6.94 2.84 3.30 4.16 6.94 
Slovakia 4.05 3.38 4.52 -5.49 10.83 2.52 4.52 5.84 10.83 
Finland 2.26 3.25 2.78 -8.27 6.25 0.72 2.78 4.21 6.25 
Sweden 2.54 2.43 2.82 -5.18 5.99 1.56 2.82 4.23 5.99 
United 
Kingdom 2.16 1.71 2.59 -4.19 3.80 2.16 2.59 3.00 3.80 
EU-28 2.58 3.43 2.81 -14.81 11.90 1.14 2.81 4.31 11.90 
Note: the real GDP growth rate was calculated as the percent variation of the gross domestic product 
at 2010 reference levels as in national currency. The data about the gross domestic product was 






Table 4   Descriptive statistics of total government expenditure per inhabitant (euro per 
person) during 1995-2015 
Country average stdev median min max q1 q2 q3 q4 
Belgium 15168.79 3085.12 15001.70 11317.52 19638.19 12355.93 15001.70 17815.77 19638.19 
Bulgaria 1311.08 700.94 1153.41 362.83 2489.75 719.24 1153.41 1900.85 2489.75 
Czech 
Republic 4548.39 1776.94 4479.95 2084.37 6831.58 2622.45 4479.95 6286.51 6831.58 
Denmark 20824.16 3723.30 20123.40 15817.71 26386.28 17565.25 20123.40 24840.95 26386.28 
Germany 13432.32 1515.86 12985.45 11473.37 16290.59 12416.83 12985.45 14909.08 16290.59 
Estonia 3247.80 1781.68 2824.75 827.86 6164.79 1607.32 2824.75 4881.55 6164.79 
Ireland 13090.24 4640.71 13639.83 5989.98 23920.88 8794.45 13639.83 16078.14 23920.88 
Greece 8052.59 2171.50 8262.07 4558.18 11561.34 6142.76 8262.07 9913.41 11561.34 
Spain 8161.66 2013.64 8165.96 5277.32 10691.43 6273.92 8165.96 9994.62 10691.43 
France 14954.30 2624.28 14872.55 11229.61 18705.47 12498.11 14872.55 17402.70 18705.47 
Croatia 4340.19 785.21 4839.42 2738.66 5096.84 3751.74 4839.42 4929.43 5096.84 
Italy 11740.12 1772.56 12069.22 8153.80 13609.19 9894.98 12069.22 13398.85 13609.19 
Cyprus 7276.03 2165.22 7958.26 3591.91 9932.27 5335.91 7958.26 9235.70 9932.27 
Latvia 2533.21 1431.70 2102.08 592.87 4582.63 1354.73 2102.08 3827.72 4582.63 
Lithuania 2547.48 1394.37 2154.20 488.23 4493.13 1406.16 2154.20 3894.13 4493.13 
Luxembourg 27279.17 7696.53 28134.83 16432.70 38200.35 20002.06 28134.83 34971.27 38200.35 
Hungary 3871.66 1337.51 4448.91 1811.99 5605.38 2366.33 4448.91 5030.58 5605.38 
Malta 5606.50 1579.51 5436.53 2989.24 8840.45 4580.42 5436.53 6538.31 8840.45 
Netherlands 14770.44 2914.43 14146.38 10567.75 18302.73 11866.00 14146.38 17975.79 18302.73 
Austria 16028.83 2742.50 15791.68 12212.70 20267.90 13390.65 15791.68 18582.12 20267.90 
Poland 3059.75 1150.24 2857.14 1343.96 4667.94 2044.46 2857.14 4337.73 4667.94 
Portugal 6656.11 1611.21 7050.52 3869.70 8818.33 5323.99 7050.52 8131.39 8818.33 
Romania 1539.31 939.89 1244.83 425.74 2867.35 696.97 1244.83 2477.20 2867.35 
Slovenia 6786.14 1988.55 6563.88 3740.65 10506.06 5086.03 6563.88 8549.51 10506.06 
Slovakia 3469.61 1726.32 2891.10 1370.35 6569.43 1970.63 2891.10 5245.82 6569.43 
Finland 16154.52 3570.69 15440.43 12091.37 22029.87 12639.56 15440.43 19101.11 22029.87 
Sweden 18633.34 2820.23 18042.38 14522.57 23762.75 16227.31 18042.38 20137.14 23762.75 
United 
Kingdom 12417.36 2865.57 13281.22 6815.94 17059.51 10826.76 13281.22 14377.66 17059.51 
EU-28 9607.36 7106.66 8205.95 362.83 38200.35 4022.14 8205.95 14267.32 38200.35 
Notes: the total government expenditure per inhabitant was calculated by dividing the total 
government expenditure as in mrd.euro to total population; the data on total government expenditure 





Table 5   Descriptive statistics of total government expenditure as share to GDP (% GDP) 
during 1995-2015 
Country average stdev median min max q1 q2 q3 q4 
Belgium 51.66 2.46 51.24 48.24 55.82 49.51 51.24 53.93 55.82 
Bulgaria 37.93 3.15 37.91 30.46 43.09 36.66 37.91 40.23 43.09 
Czech 
Republic 42.86 2.80 42.50 39.95 51.81 41.04 42.50 43.16 51.81 
Denmark 54.58 2.78 55.40 49.58 58.53 52.84 55.40 56.80 58.53 
Germany 46.39 2.58 46.31 42.82 54.66 44.53 46.31 47.69 54.66 
Estonia 37.85 3.03 37.97 33.57 46.05 35.18 37.97 39.53 46.05 
Ireland 38.38 7.68 35.89 30.88 65.65 33.38 35.89 40.83 65.65 
Greece 49.11 4.81 46.59 43.71 62.13 45.80 46.59 52.46 62.13 
Spain 41.80 3.17 41.15 38.27 47.95 38.69 41.15 44.47 47.95 
France 54.02 2.12 52.99 51.13 57.32 52.34 52.99 56.44 57.32 
Croatia 46.76 1.28 47.06 44.72 48.83 45.40 47.06 47.67 48.83 
Italy 48.85 1.96 48.31 45.50 51.80 47.24 48.31 50.78 51.80 
Cyprus 38.36 4.20 38.63 30.82 48.68 34.45 38.63 41.44 48.68 
Latvia 37.10 2.96 37.01 33.53 44.80 35.15 37.01 37.48 44.80 
Lithuania 37.89 4.35 36.12 33.58 50.27 34.82 36.12 40.84 50.27 
Luxembourg 41.84 2.35 41.63 37.61 46.03 40.20 41.63 44.01 46.03 
Hungary 49.89 1.71 49.64 47.21 55.38 48.78 49.64 50.72 55.38 
Malta 41.89 1.20 41.81 39.14 45.19 41.40 41.81 42.33 45.19 
Netherlands 45.24 2.74 44.74 41.77 53.70 43.47 44.74 46.92 53.70 
Austria 51.75 1.68 51.12 49.12 55.45 50.81 51.12 52.57 55.45 
Poland 44.55 2.20 44.54 41.48 51.01 43.14 44.54 45.29 51.01 
Portugal 46.07 3.21 45.32 42.45 51.82 43.15 45.32 48.53 51.82 
Romania 36.13 2.45 35.52 32.95 40.95 34.34 35.52 38.34 40.95 
Slovenia 47.17 3.89 45.83 42.19 60.27 44.91 45.83 48.56 60.27 
Slovakia 43.29 4.77 41.97 36.13 53.09 39.91 41.97 45.63 53.09 
Finland 52.82 4.54 52.36 46.80 61.05 48.52 52.36 56.20 61.05 
Sweden 53.86 3.75 52.78 49.65 63.51 51.35 52.78 54.37 63.51 
United 
Kingdom 42.68 3.56 42.75 37.82 49.60 40.02 42.75 44.96 49.60 
EU-28 45.01 6.58 44.86 30.46 65.65 40.21 44.86 49.91 65.65 












GDP) P (mrd.inhabitants) 
GP (RON 






average 117.93 36.13 0.02 5354.29 320.96 14579.92 
median 96.10 35.52 0.02 4507.39 290.49 13625.39 
st.dev. 92.12 2.45 0.00 4060.82 247.14 10882.47 
min 2.61 32.95 0.02 131.37 7.66 385.33 
max 253.23 40.95 0.02 11164.83 712.83 31428.68 
Source: Ameco 
